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policing models and police studies are predicated. It offers an extreme, but apposite, example that problematizes and illuminates some of the ways in which international organisations, in particular, think about police and act in relation to police in the global South. It suggests that the essence of what police are, and do, in areas of limited statehood, is to be found in the knowledge and skills needed to fulfil societal expectations regarding the management of low-level forms of disorder, rather than in a specific model or ideal. It tests the belief that police forces are inherently hierarchical organisations empowered by states to enforce their laws and manage their preferred form of order, and it raises questions about the relationship between security delivered by the state and security delivered through social processes. In other words, Somali experience brings out the fundamentals of policing in ways that are not otherwise obvious (Lenz, Beek and Göpfert 2013) . It helps to re-contextualise international notions of police and policing.
In this article, I propose that policeness is a quality that has as much to do with the symbolic and coercive functions associated with the idea of a police as with particular forms of state-based organisation, capacity or activity. I build on Lund's understanding of stateness as an amalgamation of public authority by local institutions 'conjugated with the idea of the state' (italics in original , Lund 2006 : 685. Compare Leftwich 2010 Risse 2012) to argue that in areas of limited or fragmented statehood such as Somalia, the idea of policeness, of being police, is as influential as the institutional ideals promoted by the international community. Further, the key factor influencing policeness in such environments is security levels. While policeness is reproduced discursively by sets of social actors, legacy issues and the ever-present threat of political or physical violence ensure that it is not merely a category created by language games. In fact, political imperatives and cultural continuities ensure that indigenous notions of police and policeness incorporate not only statist notions aligned to Western models, but also locally negotiated forms of authority, both of which are influenced primarily by security levels and social practices; to paraphrase Holdaway's observation on police culture, policeness 'acts as a lens' through which law, policy and practice are refracted (Holdaway 2013: 710) .
Conducting the research needed to address these issues in Somalia is challenging; the ethnographic work advocated by, for example, Cockcroft is for now impossible (Cockcroft 2007; Holdaway 2013), 3 as is the implementation of scientifically rigorous evaluation studies or in-country experiments designed to assess the ways in which being police is articulated, understood and perceived historically. Nevertheless, a consistent picture of Somali police emerges from four-week's fieldwork conducted on behalf of the UNDP's Rule of Law Programme in Somalia (ROLS) in Somaliland, Puntland and Nairobi in September 2011, 2 which permits exploration of the nature of policeness.
Based on personal observations and semi-structured interviews with approximately 30 Somali officers, supplemented by interviews with officials, elders, district safety committees, oversight committees and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from across Somalia's entities, and crosschecked against interviews with international police advisers and officials in Nairobi and the UK in 2012 and 2013, I propose that Somalia's experience offers a fresh perspective on policing and policeness. It challenges significant aspects of Western police studies while confirming others, thus prompting reflection on the applicability of Western criminological research to non-Western environments.
Developing in four parts, the discussion that follows considers first the notion of policeness. To explore the explanatory value of policeness, it addresses, second, the nature and composition of Somali-style police and policing before, third, paying special attention to the significance for policeness of security levels. This is examined in the light of Mogadishu's experience. It concludes that policeness is best understood as a label that is applied to both specific organisations and the set of social relations that the label's use produces and manages.
ARGUMENT AND CASE STUDY
Police studies and international assistance projects are predicated on the assumption that officers from different countries share functional concerns, organisational preferences, occupational commonalities and traits, which reflect the danger and authority associated with policework. The notion of policeness can help us to assess the analytical and empirical implications of this.
Admittedly, policeness is not a commonly understood term. Also, it is a broad descriptive notion, which lacks precision and an underlying ontological reality. But it has value as an explanatory tool, especially when applied to police in complex and dynamic environments, such as Somalia's, about whom little is known. Additionally, it helps to make sense of situations in which the analytical and empirical boundaries between police and informal policing providers such as militia and self-defence units are ambiguous. In such cases, it is more helpful than, say, culture or function, and can help to redress their limitations. regime-based systems of social control, and their defining feature is thought to arise from their role as a 'mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiable coercive force' (Bittner 1970: 131; Bittner 1985) .
The potential for officers to abuse their power is accordingly high and some form of control filter or restraint is needed. Hence the insistence by oversight bodies, governments and IGOs that professionalism is essential, as in the application of accountability procedures intended to limit or manage officers' decisions and actions.
Current definitions of professionalism are less stringent than those used during the 1950s when the emphasis was on activities founded on a body of systematic theory that involves complicated operations requiring a lengthy training and specialist expertise, sanctioned by the host community and regulated by a code of ethics (e.g. Huntington 1957 ). 4 Today, professionalism is increasingly about status, service and accountability to civilian oversight bodies, as in 'professionalism in the delivery of policing services to all local communities' (PSNI 2011). The international community uses the term to allude to recognition by officers of the limits of their functional competence, the temptations offered by their coercive powers, and their subordination to the civilian, political and, in some cases, social and religious leaders who make decisions affecting the delivery of security and justice. But elsewhere in the world professionalism refers to international and/or political recognition, rather than qualifications, training or behaviour, as when Zimbabwe's police commissioner claimed that the professionalism of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) -'which is in harmony with international policing standards' -had led to the ZRP being regularly invited to provide UN peacekeeping duties:
the ZRP 'remains a shining beacon of proficient policing in the region and internationally' (Herald 2005) . From an international perspective, police professionalism alludes to officers accepting socially agreed restraints on the application of coercion, but from a Zimbabwean perspective it concerns the effective delivery of specific political aims and objectives.
In most, if not all, scholarly and policy-relevant studies, policework and policeness are thought to require a hierarchical, disciplined and uniformed organisation; constables may exercise considerable discretion and detectives may work in civilian clothes, but ranks and uniforms are usually understood as representing the discipline required to control the temptations policework brings. In fact, discipline is a key concept underpinning Western conceptions of policeness because it prompts a range of issues or characteristics thought to require the appearance, ranks and command structures associated with police. As Stone noted in 1929, 'in a dozen obvious ways the discipline of a police force is indicated by the mere appearance of the policeman on duty ... A disciplined patrolman possesses that "indefinable something" which makes him responsive to orders and authority. To determine what this indefinable something might be, takes us to the root of police organisation and into the various angles of police control' (Stone 1929: 63) . Seventy years later, Deflem stated that 'Police bureaucracies are hierarchically-ordered with a clear chain of command ... and policework follows set rules and procedures ...' (Deflem 2000: 744; Deflem 2002: 18) .
To achieve this result (and the accountability required to manage or restrain a police's coercive capacity or potential for corruption), negative and positive forms of discipline are required, though neither are unique to police and do not, therefore, represent policeness in isolation. Negative discipline uses punishment or the fear of penalties (often involving external agents) whereas positive discipline refers to an attitude or habit of obedience (Gourley 1950 (Gourley /1951 . And positive discipline requires a degree of indoctrination -which may be professionalisation under another name -that is invariably expressed in terms of normative goals (e.g. Bayley 2006). 
Somalia's regional police forces
Somalia (or, more accurately, the former Somalia) is commonly regarded as the paradigmatic collapsed state yet it is actually managed by a variety of security and administrative entities, each of which has its own police. The various entities are linked ethnically and economically but have different levels of stability and styles of security governance, which refers here to the rules, processes and interactions through which decisions are made and authority exercised. Further, although the international agenda for Somalia focuses on Mogadishu as the capital of a unified state, and on its Somali Police Force (SPF) as a national police, in practice IGOs and donors divide Somalia into three main administrative areas and three distinct forces: the Somaliland Police Force operates in the northwest, the Puntland Police Force works in the north-east and the SPF is confined to Mogadishu on the coast (South-Central is residual, rather than an entity, and its cross-hatching of clans obstructs the development of an entity, let alone a police). This division reflects the fact that Somaliland declared itself an independent republic in 1991, Puntland claimed autonomy in 1998, while the international community supports a government confined to Mogadishu, which remains dangerously insecure.
Somali police have little in common with the picture presented by the OECD, Stone or Deflem, and this must affect the ways in which their authority is established and perceived in everyday local settings. Nevertheless, they are regarded by both the populace and international organisations as police. More importantly, all three share sufficient commonalities with police in other regions to offer a baseline for exploring the fundamentals of policeness, and the ways in which police authority is constituted, and recognised, in societies subject to chronic insecurity and high levels of illiteracy.
Indeed, Somalia is a particularly valuable case in which to explore policeness because its forces cover a policing spectrum that spans Somaliland's relatively developed system and an SPF comprising militiamen in uniform who are expected to provide civilian policing in the middle of insurgency and humanitarian emergencies, with Puntland's emergent force positioned between the two. Further, Somalia emphasises the nuanced nature of policeness and its subjection to politics and local power relations. International advisers may regard Puntland's police as technically and institutionally five years behind Somaliland's, but institutional development has been possible in both because their forces were established after political settlements were agreed; regardless of their exploitative behaviour, Somaliland and Puntland police are regarded as legitimate forces, and are seen as essential elements in their governments' control apparatus. But this is not the case in Mogadishu where the SPF claims to have inherited the mantle of independent Somalia's national force, but is actually only one policing provider among many.
SOMALI-STYLE POLICENESS
Given that many Somali officers lack the appearance and skills associated with Western-style policeness, two questions arise: How do Somali police rate on an understanding based on coercion, discipline, hierarchy and professionalism? Why is an elderly ex-militia man in a vest regarded as a (Perito 2002) , and are in some cases (notably in Somaliland) consciously developing the complex of practices, procedures and norms required for the capacity building through which institution-building is thought to emerge and be expressed. Somalia police are structured on lines common throughout Africa and are familiar with conventional international practices and procedures, even as they filter them through local interests and dispositions. Like their peers around the world, they respond to imported practices in an adaptive manner, integrating aspects of international understanding with local realities and personal or group experience.
But context matters. In Somalia, social processes and cultural continuities (i.e. clannism) are more important than either international policing models or state-based authority, and notions of policeness accommodate this. The situation is further nuanced by four additional factors. First, while it is widely agreed that a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion is a defining element of the police role (Bittner 1970) , socially sanctioned coercion already plays a significant role in daily life in Somalia;
the Somali preference for negotiation, informal arrangements and manoeuvre is underpinned by the threat of physical or political violence (Höehne and Luling 2010) . At the same time, and this is a second factor, memories of the effective but repressive policing enforced by former president Siad
Barre are influential (Barre fled Somalia in 1991, but had been in power since 1969); senior officers and officials with experience of policing in the Barre era acknowledge the technical attractions of its institutional structures even as they emphasise that its brutality must be avoided. 10 The attractions of Barre-style effective security is even stronger in relation to Somalia's intelligence agencies, which are of higher status than its police; the CIA supports Puntland's Intelligence Agency, and many powerful clans have created agencies modelled on Barre's domestic intelligence agency, which was by far that era's strongest institution (RBC Radio 2013).
Third, anecdotal evidence suggests that politicians and influential officers and officials are attracted by the idea of developing a police because they regard it as an essential element of stateness and international recognition. However, stateness is seen as a desirable quality or organizing principle that can be traded for political purposes, rather than a process or precursor to state-building, which many associate with a predatory state (Renders 2012 : 30. Contrast Brodeur 1992 . Consequently, Somalis value the status and legitimacy associated with international police models, but in practice negotiate with private actors even as they develop the police's state-based authority. Linked to this is a fourth point, which is that Somali power brokers share an entrepreneurial understanding of the police's role, and the external assistance now given to police development by IGOs and donors makes police and policing a business opportunity. The result is that influential Somalis regard many of the structures and skills associated with Western policing as desirable even as they manipulate the values and procedures promoted in its name (########). The planned and unplanned consequences of such
tactics have yet to be assessed.
Layers of knowledge
This picture suggests that Somali police exhibit a functionally ambiguous but locally acceptable form of policeness while sharing sufficient technical commonalities with police elsewhere in the world to be recognisable as police by Somalis and international s alike. The best way to understand it is to see it as reflecting layers of knowledge comprising legacy issues, international influences, functional requirements, and local norms and practices, which cumulatively represent policeness. Admittedly, layers is, like policeness, used in a descriptive, rather than a methodological or scientific manner.
Foucault's argument that systems of thought and practice are governed by rules defining the conceptual possibilities determining the boundaries of thought in any given domain or period is suggestive (Foucault 2002) , but it is difficult to identify the precise nature of Somali policeness, let alone analyse or map the 'discursive formations' influencing it. 11 Be that as it may, anecdotal evidence suggests that in areas of limited statehood and low literacy such as Somalia, perceptions of policeness are particularly affected by memories of the past. Indeed, conversations with senior officers and officials suggest that officers in all three forces build on memories of the 30 years of national policing that followed independence in 1960, even as they reject the practices of the Barre regime; rather than trying to shed its colonial-era identity, Somaliland officers and officials say the legacy is a useful reference point. 
Tactical flexibility
Of the elements affecting policing identified here, local requirements, norms and practices are the most influential because officers are recruited from and act on behalf of specific elements of Somali society, with clan-based calculations influencing every aspect of governance and social relations. Also, they must integrate traditional Somali approaches into their functional knowledge and technical skills, for, unlike the situation in, say, Liberia, the social fabric did not collapse after the country fragmented in 1991, and Somalis seeking justice look first to customary law and local or traditional non-state actors such as elders or Shari'a, rather than to police. Officers (and general-duties officers in particular) typically intervene only when requested by elders implementing customary law. 14 More generally, they engage with local elders, mayors and district security committees about issues such as land or water rights only when invited -and mayors and the members of district security councils in towns such as Puntland's Bossaso, Galkayo, Gardo and Garowe say that land and water rights are the biggest issue they hear about on daily basis. 15 Arguably, legal pluralism is the major challenge to
Western conceptions of what it means to be police.
In practice, negotiation and tactical flexibility are key themes in Somali policing, just as they are in A further complication arises from the fact that policeness (as in the technical skills associated with specialist coercive knowledge) is valued as a means to a practical end. Policing is a commodity, a business opportunity and an expression of power relations; it is part of the same political dynamics as clannism, conflict, entrepreneurialism and fragmentation, not least because Somalia is the site of multiple conflicts over territory, trade monopolies and political power fought by people without an interest in institutions or security forces they cannot control (#########). The implications of this for policing and policeness are as yet unclear, but it results in, for example, opaque decision-making surrounding senior appointments, as the case of Puntland's technically competent and politically skilful police commissioner Ali Nor Omar, shows. In 2011, after three years in post, Nor resigned unexpectedly and was replaced by one of his former deputies (he became prisons commissioner).
Officials from the UN think he was removed partly because his age made him less effective but primarily because he is an outsider from the small but aggressive Dishiishi sub-clan which has a difficult relationship with other Majateen sub-clans. 16 The replacement of the SPF commissioner three times between 2008 and 2011 is part of a similar pattern. Indeed, it is particularly striking because each new appointment resulted in international funders putting their payment of SPF stipends on hold until the officer concerned was able to demonstrate his control of the SPF.
Sharply defined ideals are misleading
In the absence of systematic fieldwork it is difficult to offer clear-cut conclusions about Somali-style Second, policing is a dangerous job incurring the risk of assassination, which must isolate officers.
Witness the experience of Hussein Jiinow Afrah, an SPF policeman who has been wounded by three improvised explosive devices since he became a policeman six years ago: 'The shrapnel still lodged in my shoulder, groin and arm causes me no end of problems. But I feel lucky because many of my friends are dead. Al-Shabaab calls me from time to time to try and intimidate me and tell me to quit the force' (SomaliaReport 2012b). It is difficult to tell whether the resultant isolation is tempered by clan relationships, or whether it encourages a sense of solidarity -or policeness -that is reinforced by having to deal with the consequences of physical danger, inadequate equipment and irregular pay.
Whatever the case, clan-based commitments and obligations are the only guarantees most Somalis can rely on; security, protection and opportunities -all depend on clan and/or personal relationships, rather than on governmental directives or institutions (Luling 2006; Gundel 2009 ), and policeness must be affected by this.
Third, officers must accommodate high levels of public distrust. Over half of the residents from the north-central town of Galkayo who responded to a survey conducted by the Hargeisa-based
Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) reported low trust in officers whom they found to be inaccessible in terms of location, and slow to respond. 18 Even so, the implications of this may be minimal given that inter-personal trust is low throughout Somalia, and similar complaints are made about police in every region of Africa (#########).
Fourth, arguably, the most significant divergence between Somali practice and international understanding arises from officers operating in a rule-based society characterized by legal pluralism:
both Somali and international-style policing displays a degree of flexibility, discretion and pragmatism, but only international policing offsets this with a hierarchical and bureaucratic organisation. Indeed, sharply defined Western-style policing models may be misleading, and it could be that Somali policeness and policing structures are, like Somali social structures, best understood as projects of changing social and political processes within unequal fields of power (albeit conventionally organized), with the emphasis on accommodation and flexibility (Little 2003: 3) .
Legacy issues, international support and local norms and practices have in this way provided Somali officers with a layered knowledge base and nuanced understanding of what it means to be police.
However, the emergence, acknowledgement and development of policeness ultimately depend on political settlements, which require relative security and stability. That Somaliland's police is the most technically developed of Somali forces is not accidental; as the director general of the ministry of the interior noted in 2011, security and stability are Somaliland's most noteworthy achievement.
19
Contrast the situation in Mogadishu where security is minimal, many SPF officers are militiamen, and the credibility of the government on whose behalf they claim to act is limited. Hence the significance of the SPF's chosen name and claimed lineage -and its utility as a tool for addressing the key contextual issue affecting the institutional and practical expression of policeness in fragile environments: security levels. 
SECURITY AS THE CRITICAL VARIABLE

Policeness re-emerges
One of the notable features of Somalia's complex and dynamic environment is that the consequences of political fragmentation for policeness and its nominally state-based authority are more limited than international policing models suggest. In Mogadishu, for instance, many SPF officers are little more than militiamen in police uniforms, yet this does not mean that they are not police any more than being former rebels precludes Eritreans or South Sudanese from being police. 20 If anything, militia affiliation is understandable, given that the SPF's lightly-armed officers confront insurgents armed with heavy machine guns and light anti-aircraft artillery. Significantly, while most Somalis want clear distinctions between police and military enforcement agencies, they are less concerned by those between police and militia (PAC 2011b; OCVP 2011) . 21 The result is that local realities are accommodated within internationally recognised police structures.
Although the SPF's technical capacity has declined, and its formal procedures and discipline are minimal, it is organized on the basis of directorates of operations, finance, training, CID, and administration, and it performs policing activities that range from counter-insurgency to traffic (PAC 2011b) . By then, the international community had ensured that most of the city's 5,000-7,000 officers (precise numbers were not known)
were dressed in light blue shirts and dark blue trousers or in military-style light brown (colour is based mainly on where the officers are trained) even if their pay was delayed and they lacked weaponry, handcuffs, batons and the pick-up trucks needed for mobility (PAC 2011a emphasises the SPF's role in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, rather than civilian policing, and routinely refers to officers as 'policemen-soldiers'. It divides activities into operations intended 'to enhance community safety' and 'street patrolling as part of wider counter terrorism efforts', noting that most relate to deterrence. In other words, its vision of policing presents international ideals filtered through local realities -but the need for a public police is unquestioned.
The SPF's workload, which was organized around divisions and stations, and based on information from street patrols, informants and government directives or orders, required officers to man checkpoints, deploy at major intersections, and conduct random stop and search operations in an effort to increase the police's presence. Thus officers in Wadajir manned a checkpoint on the district's main road and patrolled the nearby market and main bus stations armed with AK47s, talking to local people in a 'friendly' manner' (PAC 2011a).They targeted individuals or small groups suspected of armed robbery, kidnapping and looting (in March 2011 the latter involved militiamen responsible for providing night-time neighbourhood watches). Non-terrorist prosecutions were rare but counterinsurgency operations were common, with police in Hamar Weyne described as targeting 'sleeping insurgents'. No mass arrests were carried out in July though March had seen a major security operation involving 300 people charged with having unlawful weapons and violating security rules.
The July report also notes that Dharkenlay police had had a particularly difficult week, fighting youth militias armed with hand grenades and handguns who were suspected of being both armed robbers and covert insurgents, and arresting seven men (three of whom were military) who had set up illegal check points to extort money. The robust policeness this expresses is not dissimilar to that found in urban areas in, say, Kenya and Nigeria.
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CONCLUSIONS
Somali experience suggests that being police is a more ambiguous and dynamic phenomenon than the Western canon allows, reflecting a blend of political and functional imperatives, past practices, current contingencies, personal experience, societal expectations and international imperatives. It has as much to do with the symbolic and coercive functions associated with the idea of a police as with specific forms of state-based organisation, capacity or activity, important though these are. It alludes to the occupational commonalities that allow a Sri Lankan police adviser contracted to the UNDP to work with officers from Somaliland. But it cannot be defined neatly; Somali officers may align many of their practices with international policing models, but they operate in a rule-based society characterized by chronic insecurity, legal pluralism and limited statehood, and policeness must accommodate this. Context is critical, and norms and practices based on Western experience do not necessarily travel well outside the societies in which they were originally developed. Consequently, Somali policeness questions aspects of Western orthodoxy (e.g. the need for formal accountability procedures) while affirming others, such as the role of discretion and pragmatism.
Somali experience is extreme, yet its very extremity offers insight into the essence of what police are, and what makes police recognised as such. It demonstrates that policeness concerns the use by specific actors of the technical knowledge required to manage regime or societal expectations regarding the management of low-level forms of disorder. Whether it is a cause, an effect or simply a label is arguable, but in Somalia at least, policeness is usefully understood as reflecting a project of changing social and political processes within unequal fields of power, with the emphasis on accommodation and tactical flexibility.
Ultimately, policeness is a matter of perception. Internationals understand it as a quality possessed by sworn or trained officers belonging to a specific type of organisation whereas Somalis regard it as alluding to the coercive potential of members of a broader-based group. Nevertheless, in both cases, policeness is, to paraphrase Simmel's observation on trust, 'a hypothesis regarding future behaviour that is certain enough to serve as a basis for practical conduct' (Sasaki and Marsh 2011: 1) .
